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OUTSOURCING THE FILTH: PRIVATIZING 
BROWNFIELD REMEDIATION IN  
NEW JERSEY 
Alexander Maro* 
Abstract: Environmental cleanup for contaminated properties is a com-
plicated process, with liability existing at both state and federal levels. For 
many years, the federal government has largely deferred responsibility for 
the cleanup of contaminated properties to the states. New Jersey has re-
cently privatized several aspects of its environmental cleanup process. Pri-
or to privatizing the state cleanup process, New Jersey had refined the typ-
ical state model of a Voluntary Cleanup Program by creating the Brown-
field Developmental Area initiative. The Brownfield Developmental Area 
initiative was extremely effective, yet it was expensive to administer. As a 
result, New Jersey implemented the Site Remediation Reform Act, which 
totally eliminated the state’s Voluntary Cleanup Program, and privatized 
the cleanup process. This note argues against some of the policies associ-
ated with the privatization of environmental cleanup, and suggests several 
courses of action that can be implemented to maximize privatized site 
cleanup. 
Introduction 
 In May 2009, the New Jersey legislature passed the Site Remedia-
tion Reform Act (SRRA), a piece of legislation that has drastically 
changed the way environmentally contaminated properties are cleaned 
up inside the state.1 This legislation departs from previous state-run 
programs, as New Jersey joins a growing number of states who have pri-
vatized different aspects of environmental cleanup.2 These changes 
came as a direct result of state budget cuts that left the New Jersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection (NJ DEP) unable to continue 
administering its costly state-run Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP).3 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2010–11. 
1 Site Remediation Reform Act (SRRA), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10C-1 to -29 (West 2010). 
2 See id. § 58:10B-1.3 (West 2010) (“A person who initiates a remediation of a contami-
nated site . . . shall . . . hire a licensed site remediation professional to perform the reme-
diation . . . .”). 
3 Interview with Kennith Clue, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. ( Jan. 15, 2010). 
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 Site cleanup is a complicated process with layers of liability existing 
at both state and federal levels.4 Over the course of the last forty years, 
the interplay between federal and state liability has become quite set-
tled, and the federal government has deferred site cleanup to state pro-
grams.5 In New Jersey these state programs have been quite progressive. 
The Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act) of 1976 was the first 
comprehensive cleanup program in the nation.6 Similarly, New Jersey 
was one of the first states to enact a VCP that built on the Spill Act by 
maintaining its effective attributes, while solving liability problems that 
had arisen under the older model.7 Finally, New Jersey created the 
Brownfield Development Area (BDA) initiative, a program that takes a 
holistic approach to remediating contaminated sites.8 The wants and 
needs of entire communities are addressed more completely by this ini-
tiative, and it is seen as the most comprehensive program for addressing 
the problems associated with contaminated “brownfield” sites.9 
 However, most of these changes and advancements have been re-
moved by SRRA, and the liability scheme in New Jersey is now what it 
was in 1976 under the Spill Act.10 The purpose of this Note is to explore 
the history of remediation in New Jersey, identify what recent changes 
mean for that history, and propose how to maximize the potential of 
New Jersey remediation under these changes. Part I explores the first 
instances of regulation for contaminated sites at both the state and fed-
eral level.11 Part II identifies the issue of brownfields that came about 
                                                                                                                      
4 Amy Pilat McMorrow, Note, CERCLA Liability Redefined: An Analysis of the Small Busi-
ness Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act and Its Impact on State Voluntary Cleanup 
Programs, 20 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1087, 1087, 1096 (2004). 
5 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (2006). 
6 See Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11 to  
.11z (West 2010); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice 
Analysis, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 596 (2001) (“State involvement in cleanups predates the 
enactment of CERCLA. New Jersey led the way with the enactment of the Spill Compensa-
tion and Control Act in 1976, four years before the passage of CERCLA.”). 
7 See Lynn Singband, Brownfield Redevelopment Legislation: Too Little, but Never Too Late, 14 
Fordham Envtl. L.J. 313, 320 (2003). 
8 See Brief Synopsis of NJDEP’s Brownfield Development Area Initiative, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot. (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.state.nj.us/dep//srp/brownfields/bda/bda_synopsis.pdf. 
9 See id. The EPA definition of a brownfield is “real property, the expansion, redevel-
opment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a 
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.” CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A). Simi-
larly, the New Jersey definition is, a “former or current commercial or industrial site that is 
currently vacant or underutilized and on which there has been, or there is suspected to 
have been, a discharge of a contaminant.” SRRA, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10B-1 (West 2010). 
10 See id. § 58:10B-1.3. 
11 See infra Part I. 
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because of the enactment of the regulations examined in Part I.12 Part 
III explains the response efforts taken by state and federal legislatures to 
combat the problems identified in Part II.13 Part IV analyzes a new pro-
gram that provides a comprehensive regulatory solution that surpasses 
previous remediation efforts in dealing with all aspects of a cleanup.14 
Part V discusses the cancellation of a prominent remediation program 
and examines what changes the cancellation brings to New Jersey.15 Fi-
nally, Part VI analyzes the changes to remediation in New Jersey, dis-
cusses how those changes will affect the state, and explains how the 
changes can be implemented to maximize the goals of site cleanup.16 
I. Regulating Brownfields at Federal and State Levels 
A. Liability Under the Federal Scheme 
 Starting with the publication of Silent Spring in 1962, and moving 
into the 1970s and 1980s, public perception of environmental issues 
forced Congress to create legislation to protect the environment.17 One 
early piece of important environmental legislation was the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976.18 Although RCRA is 
an important piece of environmental legislation, it is only designed to 
monitor hazardous waste production, and does not extend to sites al-
ready contaminated with other materials.19 In response to what some 
commentators have referred to as a “gaping loophole” in RCRA’s 
scope, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980.20 The hallmark of 
CERCLA is its overarching liability scheme—its ability to create broad 
liability for cleanup.21 
                                                                                                                      
12 See infra Part II. 
13 See infra Part III. 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 See infra Part V. 
16 See infra Part VI. 
17 See Gabriel A. Espinosa, Building on Brownfields: A Catalyst for Neighborhood Revitaliza-
tion, 11 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2000). See generally, Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (First 
Mariner Books 2002) (1962) (widely known text discussing environmental effects of pesti-
cide use). 
18 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2006). 
19 Espinosa, supra note 17, at 6. 
20 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006); see Espinosa, supra note 17, at 6. 
21 Singband, supra note 7, at 315–16 (“CERCLA classifies virtually anyone who touches 
contaminated property or its contaminant, as strictly, jointly, and severally liable for clean-
up of the property.”). 
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 CERCLA, also know as the “Superfund,” takes sites that have been 
identified as contaminated and applies strict guidelines on what type of 
cleanup each brownfield site requires.22 The “fund” part of Superfund 
refers to the EPA’s ability to pay for any emergency remediation or 
cleanup for a site that poses imminent danger to people or the envi-
ronment.23 However, the EPA is more apt to force potentially responsi-
ble parties (PRPs) to pay for remediation than it is to empty its own cof-
fers.24 The concept of PRPs is the central tenet of CERCLA’s ability to 
impose broad liability.25 Many different individuals can be considered 
PRPs,26 and they are jointly and severally liable for the costs of removal 
and remediation.27 
 On its face, CERCLA appears to be concerned mostly with reme-
diation of polluted property; however, by structuring the system of liabil-
ity the way it did, the Act also made future releases less likely.28 Knowing 
that business interests would factor into remediation costs, the drafters 
of CERCLA intended lenders and insurers to make conservative finan-
cial decisions when dealing with borrowers partaking in projects with a 
potential for environmental pollution.29 Holding former, current, and 
future owners of a property potentially responsible, CERCLA created a 
system where an incredibly broad group of individuals could be held 
liable for cleanups with the potential for a large remediation cost.30 
                                                                                                                      
22 See Shari Shapiro, The Effectiveness of Pennsylvania’s Act 2: Are Good Mechanics Enough?, 
24 Temp. J. Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 441, 444 (2005) (“The remedial actions must conform 
to the National Contingency Plan (NCP), which details the procedures for clean up of 
contaminated sites, including how much money should be spent to clean up the site and 
the extent of removal, remediation, and other actions.”). 
23 See CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9611(i). 
24 See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1093–94 (explaining that CERCLA grants the EPA 
the power to obtain the cost of remediation from PRPs, or to force the PRPs to conduct 
their own remediation). 
25 See CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
26 See id. (stating that PRPs of contaminated property include: (1) the owner and op-
erator of such a facility, (2) any person who owned or operated the facility at the time haz-
ardous materials were disposed of, (3) any person who arranged for the disposal or treat-
ment or who arranged for transport thereof, and (4) any person who accepted hazardous 
substances for transport or disposal). 
27 Jessica Higgins, Note, Evaluating the Chicago Brownfields Initiative: The Effects of City-
Initiated Brownfield Redevelopment on Surrounding Communities, 3 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 240, 
243 (2008). 
28 Espinosa, supra note 17, at 7–8. 
29 See id. 
30 See CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); Higgins, supra note 27, at 240. 
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B. Liability Under New Jersey State Acts: Spill Act & Environmental  
Cleanup Responsibility Act 
 Around the time the federal government began to pass environ-
mental protection legislation, states began a similar effort.31 New Jersey 
passed two major statutes that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Spill Act of 1976 and the Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act 
(ECRA) of 1983.32 The Spill Act actually predated the passage of CER-
CLA, and ECRA predates analogous disclosure amendments incorpo-
rated into CERCLA.33 Both the Spill Act and ECRA are enforced by the 
NJ DEP, the state version of the EPA.34 
1. The Spill Act 
 Despite predating CERCLA, both the Spill Act and ECRA bear 
striking resemblances to it, with the Spill Act actually serving as a model 
for CERCLA.35 Between the Spill Act and ECRA, the Spill Act bears the 
most resemblance to CERCLA, as the Spill Act sets the liability and re-
mediation provisions that extend to polluted sites, including sites with 
petroleum spills.36 Like CERCLA, the Spill Act has a “superfund” out of 
which the state can pay for cleanup in emergency situations, and for 
cleanup of abandoned sites where no responsible parties can be identi-
fied.37 Essentially, the Spill Act’s superfund program mirrors CERCLA’s 
independent legal authority to pursue remediation and restoration 
claims.38 In addition to paying for emergency situations, if responsible 
parties have been identified, and they fail to participate in the cleanup, 
the Spill Act permits the NJ DEP to recover three times the money it 
spent cleaning the contaminated site.39 Finally, responsible parties who 
                                                                                                                      
31 See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1087 (indicating that the federal scheme has state 
analogues). 
32 Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-6 to K-11.11 (West 2010) 
(amending and renaming the Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA), 1983 N.J. 
Laws 330 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-6 to -14)). 
33 See Revesz, supra note 6, at 605 (“New Jersey has been the pioneer in [passing disclo-
sure rules]. In 1983, three years before Congress passed the limited disclosure obligations 
discussed above, New Jersey adopted [ECRA].”). 
34 See Kathleen Chandler Schmid, Student Article, The Depletion of the Superfund and 
Natural Resource Damages, 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 483, 526 (2008). 
35 See John M. McGahren & Jeffrey P. LeJava, Brownfield Redevelopment in the Garden 
State, 15 Nat. Resources & Env’t 224, 225 (2001). 
36 Spill Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11 (West 2010); see Schmid, supra note 34, at 
526. 
37 See Schmid, supra note 34, at 526. 
38 See id. 
39 See Spill Act, § 58:10-23.11f. 
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fail to comply with NJ DEP remediation mandates may be stripped of 
any license or permit for operating hazardous or solid waste facilities.40 
 Although the Spill Act mirrors the remediation structure imposed 
against responsible parties under CERCLA, it is unlike CERCLA in that 
it has no defined set of responsible parties.41 Through judicial interpre-
tation, the New Jersey courts have produced a list of potentially respon-
sible parties similar to CERCLA’s.42 The Spill Act was amended in 1993 
to clarify some of the existing judicial interpretations of who responsi-
ble parties were.43 This, however, did little to reduce the traditional li-
ability against all former, current, and future owners.44 Essentially, the 
amendments only served to clarify what levels of management could be 
held as a responsible party,45 as well as limiting the liability of those who 
receive land as part of a trust or estate.46 Having a liability scheme simi-
lar to CERCLA means the Spill Act has virtually identical problems 
dealing with developer fear of remediation costs.47 
2. ECRA 
 ECRA, which has since been amended to be called the Industrial 
Site Recovery Act (ISRA), also had an impact on the creation of brown-
fields in New Jersey. The original focus of ECRA, and the contemporary 
idea driving ISRA, is narrower in scope than the Spill Act.48 ECRA, and 
now ISRA, specifically deals with the sale, closure, and transfer of indus-
                                                                                                                      
40 Id.; see also Kathleen Marchetti & James F. Fitzsimmons, Trustee, Executor and Fiduciary 
Liability for Environmental Contamination in New Jersey, 21 Seton Hall Legis. J. 347, 349 n.11 
(1997). 
41 Marchetti & Fitzsimmons, supra note 40, at 349. 
42 See id. (New Jersey has a “crafted definition of ‘responsible’ person that includes 
owners and operators of businesses and real property, those who owned the hazardous 
substances, and more importantly, persons who have no moral culpability for the condi-
tions, other than ownership or control of the facility.”). 
43 See Spill Act § 58:10-23.11g4. 
44 See id. (making no changes to traditional owner/operator liability). 
45 See id.; see also Marchetti & Fitzsimmons, supra note 40, at 350 (“‘Active participation’ 
and ‘participation in . . . management’ are specifically defined to mean ‘actual participa-
tion in management or operational affairs by the holder of the security interest.’ Liability, 
for those who have the ‘mere capacity or ability to influence’ or control operations, but do 
not exercise that ability, is specifically excluded.”). 
46 See Marchetti & Fitzsimmons, supra note 40, at 351–52. 
47 See infra Part III. 
48 Compare ISRA, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-6 (West 2010), with Spill Act § 58:10-23.11 
(ISRA is limited to the closure of contaminated industrial sites, and the Spill Act is a 
broader environmental regulation). 
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trial sites.49 ECRA, and now ISRA, requires that industrial sites obtain 
approval before they were sold, closed, or transferred to different own-
ership.50 To obtain the NJ DEP’s approval, the owner of the site is re-
quired to take one of two actions.51 An owner’s first option is to submit 
a declaration that there was either no discharge of a hazardous sub-
stance at that site, or that any discharge had been cleaned according to 
state standards.52 An owner’s second option is to submit a cleanup plan 
to the DEP, listing the hazardous materials present and stating the 
owner’s strategy for remediation, and to post a bond to guarantee the 
cleanup.53 If a site owner fails to submit a declaration or cleanup plan, 
he is either fined or has his property transfer voided.54 
 Because of complaints about ECRA’s clarity and application proc-
ess,55 in 1993, the New Jersey Legislature amended the Act, renaming it 
ISRA.56 ISRA has not veered from the original purpose of ECRA, to en-
force environmental cleanup during the sale, closure, or transfer of 
real property.57 Rather, the change to ISRA is an attempt to remedy the 
problems associated with the clarity of ECRA’s language.58 Some glar-
ing examples of ECRA’s failure to define essential language are evi-
denced by the imprecise definition of “industrial establishment” and 
“closing, terminating or transferring operations.”59 In fact, the failure 
to give language specific meaning and parameters “resulted in the over 
inclusion of certain non-hazardous waste or substance related opera-
tions.”60 The failure to use clear language also added uncertainty to 
ECRA.61 The amendments that changed ECRA into ISRA also gave IS-
                                                                                                                      
49 See Cooper Dev. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 762 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (D.N.J. 
1991). 
50 See ISRA § 13:1K-9. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See id.; see also Diana R. D’Alonzo, M. Kay Hennessy & Alysa B. Wakin, Comment, 
ECRA to ISRA: Is It More than Just a Name Change?, 7 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 51, 53–55 (1996). 
54 ISRA § 13:1K-13. 
55 D’Alonzo et al., supra note 53, at 55 (“The problems with ECRA included imprecise 
statutory definitions, lack of definitions for key terms, excessive costs, and procedural de-
lays.”). 
56 ISRA § 13:1K-6. 
57 See D’Alonzo et al., supra note 53, at 58. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 55–56. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 56 (“ECRA . . . left many of its key terms undefined, creating significant un-
certainty as to ECRA’s bite. The fact that ‘owner’ and ‘operator’ were not defined created 
ambiguity as to the chain of responsibility under ECRA . . . .”). 
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RA more power; important among these powers was the authority to 
initiate the state’s original Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP).62 
II. Problems Identified with CERCLA, Spill Act,  
and ECRA/ISRA 
 While CERCLA and the Spill Act have clearly been successful in 
identifying sites in need of remediation and forcing cleanup, there 
have been some negative byproducts of this type of environmental leg-
islation.63 Most problems growing out of CERCLA and the Spill Act 
deal with their broad liability schemes and the ability to hold parties 
responsible, regardless of their role in actual contamination.64 Many 
would-be sellers and developers were scared of CERCLA’s wide net of 
liability, and did not want to be responsible for a high-cost remedia-
tion.65 The more likely a developer is to be held liable, the less likely he 
would participate in a site remediation project.66 This fear of liability 
has caused the creation of many brownfields67—vacant, contaminated 
sites—with some estimates reaching 450,000–500,000 sites nationwide68 
and upwards of 10,000 sites in New Jersey alone.69 
A. Social Problems Associated with Brownfields 
 One of the most glaring problems with brownfields is that their 
existence stymies and depresses entire communities.70 First, and most 
importantly, these sites are considered brownfields because hazardous 
contaminants are either known or suspected to be present.71 These 
chemicals and pollutants, without remediation, are capable of disburs-
ing and releasing into surrounding areas, placing communities of in-
                                                                                                                      
62 See Singband, supra note 7, at 319. 
63 See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1087. 
64 See Shapiro, supra note 22, at 445; Higgins, supra note 27, at 243. 
65 See Higgins, supra note 27, at 243. “CERCLA’s broad definition of PRPs and strict 
cleanup standards . . . deterred the development of any land that even seemed as though it 
might harbor some form of contamination.” Id. 
66 See id. 
67 See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1100. 
68 Anne Marie Pippin, Note, Community Involvement in Brownfield Redevelopment Makes 
Cents: A Study of Brownfield Redevelopment Initiatives in the United States and Central And Eastern 
Europe, 37 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 589, 591 (2009). 
69 N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., SRWM Brownfields FAQ, ( Jan. 26, 2006), http://www. 
nj.gov/dep/srp/brownfields/faq/brownfields_faq.pdf. 
70 Sarah W. Rubenstein, Comment, CERCLA’s Contribution to the Federal Brownfields Prob-
lem: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 4 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 149, 150 (1997). 
71 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (2006) (EPA definition of a brownfield). 
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nocent individuals at risk.72 Additionally, brownfields are an eyesore 
and are typically concentrated in poor, urban neighborhoods.73 These 
urban areas are typically populated by low-income minority groups.74 
The cyclical nature of poverty is exacerbated by the closure of industrial 
sites left vacant for fear of CERCLA, Spill Act, and ECRA liability.75 
When a factory or plant closes, the local work force no longer has em-
ployment, and this results in both depressed job markets and depressed 
tax bases.76 The tax base becomes depressed because of the immediate 
loss of a large site paying city or municipal property taxes.77 
 However, simply because there is difficulty in developing urban 
brownfields does not mean that new development does not persist; in-
stead, new developments are pushed away from urban centers, into the 
previously unused greenfields of suburban and exurban areas.78 By 
building on previously unused areas, the environmental problem is 
made exponentially worse; not only is a polluted site languishing, but 
greenfields and the benefits associated with such a space are removed.79 
The process of building on previously open space is linked to the eco-
nomic detriment of those communities surrounding brownfields.80 
Employment sprawls with the development of new industrial and office 
parks, forcing the urban employees originally affected by the closure of 
plants within their communities to either leave those communities or 
make an onerous commute.81 
B. Financial Problems 
 With the enactment of broad liability, it became less expensive for 
many property owners to let a site languish in disuse than it was to re-
                                                                                                                      
72 McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1088. 
73 Singband, supra note 7, at 317. 
74 Id. 
75 See Rubenstein, supra note 70, at 150. 
76 Id. 
77 See id. 
78 See Singband, supra note 7, at 339 (discussing the impacts of “urban sprawl,” one such 
impact being the destruction of previously untouched land that is known as a “greenfield”). 
79 See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1095–96 (defining greenfields as “previously unde-
veloped areas on the outskirts of urban locales”). 
80 See Rubenstein, supra note 70, at 150. 
81 See id. (“As the job base shifts to locations farther away from cities and residential ar-
eas, the work force becomes more dependent on automobiles for transportation, because 
mass transit cannot economically reach outlying areas.”). 
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mediate it, or be exposed to liability during a sale.82 In New Jersey, the 
liability associated with a sale is even higher due to the rigorous stan-
dards under the current ISRA and former ECRA.83 The problem of 
brownfields extends past the owner/seller paradigm, and reaches to 
buyers, developers, and financers.84 Developers who would potentially 
purchase a brownfield in an effort to revitalize a community eyesore 
would be jointly and severally liable for all remediation costs of that 
site, even if the developer had no involvement with the original disper-
sal of hazardous materials.85 The potential for spending an incredible 
sum of money on remediation for land that the developer did not pol-
lute was enough to cause interested developers to walk away.86 
 Under CERCLA, lenders are less likely to lend money to develop-
ers for two distinct reasons: the inability for a lender to foreclose on a 
polluted property used as collateral in a secured transaction, and the 
general disinterest in lending to developers that have the potential to 
be driven into bankruptcy during a forced remediation.87 
 Brownfields illustrate that there are both financial and social pit-
falls to the liability scheme that CERCLA and analogous New Jersey acts 
set in place during the late 1970s and early 1980s.88 The brownfield 
phenomenon became clearly linked with urban decay,89 and when this 
was clear to federal and state legislatures, they began to take steps to fix 
the problem.90 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Espinosa, supra note 17, at 8–9 (“Property owners attempting to sell unwanted 
facilities may be faced with large testing costs and potential cleanup bills that may render a 
‘hold’ decision to be the most economically sound.”); Pippin, supra note 68, at 596. 
83 See ISRA, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-6 (West 2010). 
84 See Espinosa, supra note 17, at 7–8; Scott Sherman, Government Tax and Financial In-
centives in Brownfields Redevelopment: Inside the Developer’s Pro Forma, 11 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 
317, 321 (2003). 
85 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(1) (2006) (extending liability to any “owner” of a 
facility). 
86 See Espinosa, supra note 17, at 8–9 (“Among the litany of potential reasons for lack 
of use, however, PRP liability reigns supreme among contenders.”). 
87 See Sherman, supra note 84, at 321–22 (“Brownfield projects—like all other real es-
tate ventures—cannot proceed if . . . the developer cannot obtain financing.”); Pippin, 
supra note 68, at 591. 
88 See Espinosa, supra note 17, at 8 (describing the unintentional “chilling effect” of 
CERCLA and state acts); Singband, supra note 7, at 339. 
89 Pippin, supra note 68, at 596 (listing the characteristics of urban decay as “depopula-
tion, high unemployment, increased crime rates, poverty, and the decline of urban-poor 
and minority neighborhoods”). 
90 See id.; see also Higgins, supra note 27, at 245. 
2011] Privatizing Brownfield Remediation in New Jersey 169 
III. Federal and State Responses to Brownfield Problems 
A. CERCLA Amendments and the Brownfields Act 
 The federal response to the brownfields crisis was a gradual proc-
ess starting in the late 1980s, building towards a major CERCLA 
amendment—the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revi-
talization Act (Brownfields Act) of 2002.91 Previous to enacting the 
Brownfields Act, Congress had made some strides towards minimizing 
specific forms of purchaser liability and encouraging development of 
brownfields.92 The three most important adjustments to CERCLA be-
fore the Brownfields Act are: (1) the addition of a “third party defense”; 
(2) the “innocent landowner defense”; and (3) amendments to the 
EPA’s settlement authority.93 
 The “third party defense” allows indemnity for landowners who can 
demonstrate several factors that prove the contamination in question 
was the fault of a third party.94 In 1986, Congress built on the “third par-
ty” defense by creating the “innocent land owner defense.”95 This de-
fense is applicable to defendants who can demonstrate that the prop-
erty’s contamination occurred before the defendants purchased the 
land, and that prior to the purchase the defendants had no reason to 
believe that any contamination existed.96 Finally, in 1989, Congress 
broadened the scope of the EPA’s authority to enter into settlements.97 
The 1989 changes deal primarily with entering into settlements with “de 
minimus landowners and generators,”98 but the ability to enter into set-
                                                                                                                      
91 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
118, 115 Stat. 2356 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (2006)). 
92 See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1096–99. 
93 See id. at 1097–98. 
94 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (2006) (defendant landowner must “establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous sub-
stance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by . . . an act or omission of 
a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant”); see McMorrow, supra 
note 4, at 1097 (requiring that “(1)the contamination arose solely from acts or omissions 
of a third party with whom [defendant landowner] is not in a contractual relationship, (2) 
the owner exercised due care regarding the hazardous substances involved, and (3) the 
owner ‘took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of [a] third party’ . . . .”) 
(citing CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)). 
95 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35); McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1097. 
96 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35); McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1097 (emphasizing 
the Act’s requirements of due care and the need to conduct “all appropriate inquires”). 
97 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g); McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1098. 
98 See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1098 (describing how the EPA can enter into a set-
tlement where a PRP pays only a specific amount for remediation in return for indemnity). 
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tlements is the logical precursor to the EPA entering into a Memoranda 
of Agreement (MOA) with individual states under the Brownfields Act.99 
 These changes eliminated purchaser liability, but only in narrow 
instances.100 The changes during the 1980s laid the ground work for 
Congress’s most substantial attempt at solving the brownfield prob-
lem—the Brownfields Act.101 The Brownfields Act made minor changes 
to existing CERCLA liability and revolutionized the manner in which 
cleanups were to be overseen.102 Some of the more superficial changes 
to CERCLA were changes to the “innocent land owner” exception, as 
well as the additions of “contiguous property owner” and “bona fide 
prospective purchaser” exemptions.103 However, the most groundbreak-
ing change that occurred as a result of the Brownfields Act was Con-
gress’s decision to defer almost all remediation efforts to state voluntary 
programs.104 
 Until the passage of the Brownfields Act, developers completing 
remediation programs under state VCPs had a formal set of liabilities 
with the state; however, the possibility for federal action under CERCLA 
persisted.105 The Brownfields Act is structured so that a site which has 
been, or is in the process of being remediated under a state program 
will not be subject to administrative or cost recovery actions by the 
EPA.106 In fact, this Act applies to all state programs, despite the great 
disparity in remediation requirements between the programs; there is 
no specific set of standards required by the EPA, nor is there an ap-
proval process.107 One of the driving factors behind the Brownfields Act 
was “slow-moving federal initiatives and a general lack of direction.”108 
The EPA did not want to continue this trend, so instead of creating a 
                                                                                                                      
99 See Voluntary Cleanup Program, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., http://www.state.nj.us/ 
dep/srp/volclean/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). 
100 See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1096–99. 
101 See id. at 1101. 
102 See id. at 1101–02. 
103 See id. at 1102–09. 
104 See Higgins, supra note 27, at 244–45. While state VCPs will take over many sites—
the most badly contaminated sites—those on the National Priorities List (NPL) will remain 
the concern of the EPA. McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1100. 
105 See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1113. A VCP is a program that “allows any party to 
voluntarily remediate non-priority contaminated sites that pose no immediate threat to 
human health or the environment.” Singband, supra note 7, at 319 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
106 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (2006); see Robert D. Fox & Paul McIntyre, A Summary 
and Analysis of the Federal Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, 21 
Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 19, 26 (2002). 
107 See Fox & McIntyre, supra note 106, at 26–27. 
108 McMorrow, supra note 4, at 113. 
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complicated state application process, it chose to defer to states with the 
exception of a narrow set of “reopeners” designed to deal with problem 
sites.109 As a result, the EPA will not interfere with an “eligible site” re-
mediated through a state plan except if a “reopener” is triggered.110 
 Additionally, the EPA will enter into MOAs with each state, docu-
menting its commitment not to pursue enforcement actions at those 
sites cleaned up under state VCPs.111 Since the passage of this Act, there 
has been an increase in the number of developers and landowners who 
voluntarily come forward for remediation under their state pro-
grams.112 Redevelopment initiatives now have clarity, and can proceed 
in a state-centric manner. By following a state VCP, developers will no 
longer be concerned with being hit by an EPA suit above and beyond 
what was agreed to in a developer-state agreement.113 Once a developer 
completes the VCP, it is absolved of virtually all liability.114 
B. New Jersey’s Initial Response: The New Jersey VCP 
 New Jersey enacted its VCP in 1992, making it an early model for 
other states’ cleanup programs.115 Enacted pursuant to ISRA, the VCP 
is operated by the NJ DEP.116 Like the federal Brownfields Act, the New 
Jersey VCP is not applicable to all sites;117 rather, it is aimed at sites that 
have not been identified as “priority” sites, and therefore do not have 
the potential for immediate health or environmental effects.118 After 
the Brownfields Act delegated almost all authority of brownfield reme-
diation to state VCPs, it became the job of each VCP to structure the 
                                                                                                                      
109 See Fox & McIntyre, supra note 106, at 27. 
110 CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9601(41) (defining an “eligible response site”); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9628(b)(1)(B) (listing reopening factors); see Fox & McIntyre, supra note 106, at 27 
(summarizing types of sites that do not qualify as an “eligible response site” and listing the 
“reopener” factors). 
111 See McMorrow, supra note 4, at 1115. 
112 Id. at 1115 (attributing this to “The EPA’s commitment to memoranda of agree-
ment, the Brownfields Act, and the realistic unlikelihood that the EPA will expend its lim-
ited resources pursuing a site that a party has already remediated under a state program 
. . . .”). 
113 See id. (discussing how the EPA and state VCPs are now “partners”). 
114 See id. 
115 Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields at 20: A Critical Reevaluation, 34 Ford. Urb. L.J. 721, 737 
(2007); Voluntary Cleanup Program, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra note 99. 
116 See N.J. Admin. Code § 7:26B-1.1 (2010); Voluntary Cleanup Program, N.J. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., supra note 99. 
117 Voluntary Cleanup Program, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra note 99. 
118 See Singband, supra note 7, at 319. 
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programs in such a way that they would spur brownfield redevelop-
ment—the original purpose of the state and federal amendments.119 
 In order to attract developers, the New Jersey VCP created a flexi-
ble program—one that allowed developers to clean up a site at what-
ever pace they chose.120 The developer-scheduled pacing is established 
in a MOA entered into between the developer and New Jersey.121 Filing 
for an MOA is the first step in the New Jersey VCP process and that 
MOA not only governs the remediation schedule, but additionally stip-
ulates the scope of cleanup for the site in question.122 Depending on 
the intended use, the level of remediation required can be negotiated 
in the MOA; however, the NJ DEP does have a list of “technical re-
quirements” for site remediation.123 Under an MOA, a developer who 
once feared that investigating a potential site for development would 
subject him to liability can conduct a partial investigation or remedia-
tion without penalty.124 
 After entering into the MOA with NJ DEP, the next step for a de-
veloper is to actually remediate the site within the MOA’s stipulated 
guidelines.125 After a site is remediated within those guidelines, the NJ 
DEP will issue a No Further Action Letter (NFAL).126 The NFAL is the 
embodiment of the NJ DEP’s determination that the completed reme-
diation is acceptable, and that it foresees no need for future remedia-
tion.127 Specifically, the state statute indicates that such a letter is evi-
dence that there are no discharged contaminants at the site, or that the 
contaminants once present have been acceptably removed.128 In most 
circumstances, a covenant not to sue accompanies the NFAL.129 The 
                                                                                                                      
119 See id. at 320 (“The [NJ] VCP went a long way toward providing developers with an 
incentive to touch brownfields.”). 
120 See Eisen, supra note 115, at 737 (describing flexibility as “a critical element” of the 
NJ VCP). 
121 Singband, supra note 7, at 319. 
122 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:26C-2.1 (2002); see Singband, supra note 7, at 319. 
123 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:26E. 
124 Eisen, supra note 115, at 737. 
125 See Singband, supra note 7, at 319. 
126 Voluntary Cleanup Program, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra note 99. 
127 See Singband, supra note 7, at 319. 
128 N.J. Admin. Code § 7:26C-2.6(a). 
129 See Singband, supra note 7, at 319–20. Some parties liable under different acts will 
receive an NFAL, but no covenant not to sue. Id. Specifically, “[a] party liable under the 
Spill Act is not eligible for a covenant not to sue. . . . However, persons who acquire prop-
erty after a discharge occurs may obtain protection against state-imposed civil liability after 
a cleanup is completed and against private third-party liability upon commencement of 
site remediation.” See Norman W. Spindel, N.J. Environmental Liability—From Innocence to 
Enlightenment, Envtl. Compliance & Litig. Strategy, Apr. 1998, at 7, 7. 
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covenant not to sue formally acknowledges the conditions of the NFAL 
in a legal document.130 Also included in the covenant is a release for 
any outside contractors brought to help in remediating the site; this 
release enables developers to seek professionals who might pass on a 
project but for such an indemnity.131 
 Through delegation of federal power to the New Jersey VCP, devel-
opers and prospective purchasers are left on surer footing.132 The use of 
MOAs through the VCP clearly outlines all liability, and if the developer 
follows those outlines while cleaning up the site, he can expect the state 
to issue a NFAL, as well as a covenant not to sue.133 Having those docu-
ments to fall back on eliminates much of the apprehension associated 
with remediation; obviously, the developers will have to remediate the 
site, yet their possibility of unforeseen lawsuits becomes remote.134 
IV. More Ancillary Problems and New Jersey’s Second 
Remediation Program 
 The version of the New Jersey VCP promulgated in the 1990s was 
only the first round of attempts to address brownfield remediation.135 It 
is often referred to as a “first generation” program.136 An unintended 
result of remediation under the first generation program was remedia-
tion on a site-by-site basis, where only the most desirable plots were 
used.137 Following logic, the most “commercially viable brownfield 
properties in New Jersey have been cleaned up [first].”138 However, in 
an urban area with dozens of brownfields, the remediation of one site 
hardly addresses the core problems of urban blight.139 Site-by-site reme-
diation is typically driven by purely financial motives; the best sites are 
selected, and the project is leveraged for as much money as possible.140 
Site-by-site remediation did little to alleviate the aesthetic, social, and 
                                                                                                                      
130 See Singband, supra note 7, 319–20. 
131 See id. at 320. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 D. Evan van Hook, Judith Auer Shaw & Kenneth J. Kloo, The Challenge of Brownfield 
Clusters: Implementing a Multi-Site Approach for Brownfield Remediation and Reuse, 12 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 111, 113 (2003). 
136 Id. 
137 See id. 
138 Id. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at 149 (“The property-by-property approach creates a strong imperative for 
individual property owners to maximize the commercial value of their individual proper-
ties.”). 
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degenerative problems associated with the concentration of multiple 
brownfields within a single community.141 
A. The New Jersey Brownfield Development Area 
 Several state legislatures, New Jersey in particular, saw a way of 
structuring the brownfield program to steer developers away from a 
site-by-site approach.142 It is in this vein that the “second generation” of 
brownfield remediation came to exist.143 The second generation pro-
gram in New Jersey is marked by the addition of a community steering 
committee and a desire to bring developers, NJ DEP agency employees, 
and the citizens of affected communities together.144 During the crea-
tion of the second generation program, in addition to the New Jersey 
VCP, the state added a Brownfield Development Area (BDA) pro-
gram.145 The BDA’s goal is to help “communities containing multiple 
brownfield sites in close proximity to each other to design and imple-
ment remediation and reuse plans for each property simultaneously.”146 
Improvements of community remediation include increased efficiency 
in investigation and remediation, heightened community participation 
in planning, and greater coordination between developers and com-
munities.147 
 The BDA has been referred to as being both “structured and flexi-
ble.”148 Flexibility is needed when dealing with multiple owners and 
different site contaminants, while structure is needed to succeed in en-
suring compliance and remediation.149 New Jersey only considers a 
handful of BDA projects per year, making the application process quite 
competitive.150 In order to even submit an application, a community 
“steering committee” needs to be formed.151 Once an acceptable steer-
ing committee exists, it must produce an application that not only in-
                                                                                                                      
141 See van Hook et al., supra note 135, at 117. 
142 See Pippin, supra note 68, at 605. 
143 See van Hook et al., supra note 135. 
144 See Pippin, supra note 68, at 606. 
145 See id. at 605. 
146 Id. 
147 van Hook et al., supra note 135, at 114. 
148 Id. at 118. 
149 See id. at 118–19. 
150 Brief Synopsis of NJDEP’s Brownfield Development Area Initiative, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., supra note 8. 
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“neighborhood residents, property owners, potential developers, community organiza-
tions, environmental groups, and others”). 
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cludes the names and locations of the brownfields potentially being 
addressed,152 but why these sites should be remitted, and what the 
committee wants them turned into.153 Finally, the application must take 
into consideration the uses and effects of non-brownfield sites, as well 
as existing public transportation and other infrastructure.154 
 A determination as to which communities will be granted a BDA 
program is made through a review of both the applications and the 
steering boards by NJ DEP in conjunction with other state agencies, 
including the New Jersey Economic Development Authority (NJ EDA) 
and the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (NJ DCA).155 
The selection process is quite careful due to the limited number of pro-
jects available per year.156 Upon the selection of a community for a BDA 
initiative, the community will receive special government assistance.157 
The government will lend financial assistance to the community as well 
as hire additional personnel to facilitate the BDA. Most notably, each 
project is assigned a case manager who will streamline the process of 
remediation planning, a significant advance from first generation pro-
grams.158 Not only does assigning a single case manager streamline the 
process, it allows for consistency in all phases of the remediation ef-
fort.159 In addition to the case manager, NJ DCA and NJ EDA employ-
ees are brought in, and they form what is known as the “BDA team.”160 
 After the BDA team is in place, it, along with the steering commit-
tee and the affected municipal government, will begin discussing the 
actual process of remediation.161 There are four planning steps re-
                                                                                                                      
152 See id. 
153 See id. at 120 (“The application need not include detailed plans for the brownfield 
properties, but it must articulate a meaningful and realistic vision for where the commu-
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154 See Pippin, supra note 68, at 605–06. 
155 See van Hook et al., supra note 135, at 120 (noting that the interagency determina-
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160 Id. 
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quired before actually engaging in remediation.162 The first step is an 
initial meeting and environmental assessment.163 The most important 
function of the first planning step is the NJ DEP’s guarantee that each 
brownfield within the BDA will receive a preliminary environmental 
assessment.164 Until the implementation of the BDA, the state had not 
taken responsibility for environmental assessments, deferring the as-
sessments to developers.165 Under the BDA, the state has several ways to 
allocate funds for the preliminary environmental assessment.166 Having 
diversified funding sources greatly alleviates the responsibility of the 
developer, increasing the likelihood that the developer will engage in 
such projects to begin with.167 Even in the absence of outside funding, 
the state commits itself to making sure assessments are completed.168 
 After the initial meeting and environmental assessments are com-
pleted, the second step, a preliminary planning meeting, can begin.169 
During the preliminary planning meeting, a feasibility study is com-
pleted for the steering committee’s informal plan.170 The study analyzes 
the goals of the informal plan while considering information gathered 
about “traffic patterns, location of park lands or other open space, 
[and] the use of marketing studies.” This study is in addition to the en-
vironmental assessment.171 
 Third, a resource evaluation must be completed.172 Again, during 
the resource meeting, the benefits of coordinating different state agen-
cies become apparent; resources such as grants, loans, and tax credits 
are administrated differently and by different agencies. Bringing re-
sources together in one meeting helps identify those resources that ex-
ist and where they should be allocated based on the needs of different 
sites.173 The process of separate agencies allocating their own resources, 
                                                                                                                      
162 See id. at 121–27. 
163 See van Hook et al., supra note 135, at 121. 
164 See id. at 123. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. (funding options include payment by previously liable owners, state assess-
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167 See id. 
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169 van Hook et al., supra note 135, at 124. 
170 See id. at 124. 
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173 See id. at 124–25. 
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as well as securing participation from previously liable parties, has in-
creased developer interest in remediation programs.174 
 With interest from the affected communities, state agencies, and 
private developers, the final planning step—the creation of an executa-
ble remediation and reuse plan—begins.175 This is the step where all raw 
data and different plans of remediation are examined by the BDA case 
manager, and where the manager “provides guidance on the environ-
mental aspects of the remediation and whether the plans are realis-
tic.”176 The site uses are selected and a remediation schedule is con-
structed.177 This remediation schedule is used by developers, contrac-
tors, and environmental engineers while they complete each project.178 
Throughout the course of remediation, the steering committee will 
meet with the case manager to ensure that all efforts are on schedule.179 
Beyond these meetings, little more is necessary to effectuate the reme-
diation. Annual reviews monitor progress, as well as the overall timeta-
ble for remediation.180 
B. Results of the BDA Initiative 
 One assessment of New Jersey’s BDA program indicates that the 
program “results in a multi-site remediation and reuse plan that incor-
porates environmental and marketing data, planning considerations, 
and community preferences, including the preferences of both local 
residents and local elected officials.”181 This analysis is trifurcated into 
separate analyses of “technical responses,” “stakeholder involvement,” 
and “reuse benefits.”182 Each of these analyses demonstrates the ways in 
which New Jersey’s BDA program is superior to first generation pro-
grams.183 
                                                                                                                      
174 Id. at 124 (“Experience to date shows that, while the developer interest in redevel-
oping isolated brownfields may be low, this interest increases when the state collectively 
commit resources to ensuring comprehensive remediation and reuse of a BDA.”). 
175 See van Hook et al., supra note 135, at 124. 
176 Id. at 125–26. 
177 See id. (stating that the benefits of a remediation schedule are the maximization of 
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178 See id. 
179 Id. at 127. 
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181 van Hook et al., supra note 135, at 140. 
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183 See id. at 128–52. 
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 While the BDA program’s changes were primarily driven by the first 
generation’s failure to improve communities during remediation, the 
changes to the second generation program have been able to remedy 
additional sites, helping the entire community.184 By assigning each BDA 
initiative a case manager who participates in the entire planning proc-
ess, the BDA program eliminates duplicative work, maximizes financial 
efficiency, and ensures all regulations are followed.185 Essentially, each 
important step is streamlined and made more consistent by the pres-
ence of the case manager.186 In addition to a streamlined process, the 
BDA program’s structure enables the remediation of more sites.187 Be-
cause all the potential brownfields in a community are cleaned during 
the BDA, some sites that otherwise would have fallen below the state’s 
radar are caught in the BDA’s net.188 The second generation therefore 
remediates more sites, and it does so in a more efficient manner. 
 The second analysis, “stakeholder involvement,” emphasizes the 
goals of community involvement that the BDA directly sought to im-
plement.189 The BDA program provides a careful balance that increases 
the power of communities and local government, yet vests traditional 
decision-making powers with the developers controlling each site.190 
This is important because it allows developers to find out which types of 
development local citizens appreciate.191 Compromises can be struck 
between developers and community leaders, where a for-profit site 
                                                                                                                      
184 See id. at 129. 
185 Id. at 132–33 (“A single BDA case manager ensures . . . the consistent interpretation 
and application of regulatory requirements and remediation standards throughout the 
BDA. A single case manager can also coordinate the timing of specific steps of the individ-
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186 See id. at 126. 
187 See Pippin, supra note 68, at 605. 
188 See van Hook et al., supra note 135, at 129–30 (citing the fact that only four of twen-
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189 See id. at 139. 
190 See id. at 140 (explaining that “the BDA Initiative does give the reuse preferences of 
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proposal would coincide with the addition of a green space or commu-
nity-desired site.192 
 Reuse benefits, the third and final point of analysis, represent the 
most basic elements of remediation. An examination of reuse benefits 
essentially encapsulates the success of a brownfield remediation.193 The 
more sites that are cleaned the less brownfields exist, which in turn 
leads to more functioning developments, more jobs, greater residential 
housing, less urban sprawl, and more greenfields.194 Positive reuse is 
the ultimate goal because it brings more benefits with each site that is 
completed.195 
 The BDA initiative improves the likelihood of positive reuse in 
many ways.196 Many of the benefits occur as a result of the certainty as-
sociated with the BDA process.197 This certainty not only leads to effec-
tive remediation of already designated sites, but often coaxes develop-
ers to include additional properties to their plans.198 Finally, the BDA 
provides a venue for multiple affected property owners to come to-
gether to create a remediation plan that will maximize potential that 
was unavailable under site-by-site remediation.199 A site that was consid-
ered useless under the site-by-site approach can be given new life, as the 
BDA provides examples of “[s]mall properties within one BDA [being] 
combined to create a commercially viable parcel.”200 Combining prop-
erties not only creates one “viable” property, but also serves to limit ex-
posure and limit costs associated with large scale remediation.201 
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V. Cancellation of the New Jersey VCP 
A. Actual Cancellation 
 The BDA is admittedly a narrower program than the VCP.202 Since 
2002, sites not selected for the BDA initiative have been remediated in 
accordance with the New Jersey VCP, New Jersey’s first generation pro-
gram.203 Recently, however, New Jersey abandoned its VCP.204 On May 
7, 2009 the New Jersey DEP enacted the Site Remediation Reform Act 
(SRRA), a major element of which is the elimination of the New Jersey 
VCP.205 Developers conducting remediation are not to wait for a MOA; 
rather, they are to “proceed through the [remediation] process without 
waiting for Department approvals.”206 The VCP is a first generation re-
mediation program, and the NJ DEP is only able to eliminate it by re-
verting back to the liabilities associated with the Spill Act.207 Indeed, the 
SRRA “contains a provision . . . which establishes an affirmative obliga-
tion on persons to remediate any discharge for which they would be 
liable pursuant to the Spill Compensation and Control Act.”208 With 
this legislation, New Jersey moved from a state with a progressive sec-
ond generation remediation program and an established safety-net first 
generation program, to a state with a second generation program 
whose unselected sites are subjected to the general liability New Jersey 
abandoned over twenty-five years ago.209 
 The return to the Spill Act, however, is just one of two major 
changes associated with the SRRA.210 The SRRA also established a 
scheme where Licensed Site Remediation Professionals (LSRPs) are 
licensed by the state and conduct virtually all remediation in New Jer-
sey.211 This licensing scheme requires that all parties who commence 
remediation after November 3, 2009 hire LSRPs to conduct site reme-
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diation.212 The LSRP program effectively removes the NJ DEP from any 
involvement in site cleanup beyond the initial licensing of LSRPs.213 
The move towards outsourcing remediation efforts to private profes-
sionals was mainly a result of insufficient funding and an inability of the 
NJ DEP to continue administering the VCP.214 After the permitting 
process is complete, the remediation process, which was once very gov-
ernment intensive, is almost completely privatized.215 Once an LSRP is 
hired by a developer, the LSRP will not only oversee the remediation, it 
will proffer to the NJ DEP that all work has been done and all aspects of 
the remediation are consistent with state statutory requirements.216 
 Although the implementation of the LSRP program through the 
SRRA virtually eliminates the NJ DEP from the remediation process, 
they do retain some semblance of oversight.217 The NJ DEP will review 
all documents submitted by LSRPs for each site.218 However, for many 
sites, this is where oversight will cease.219 Only when special factors are 
present will the NJ DEP be forced to complete additional review of 
submitted documents, and even then there is nothing that mandates 
that the NJ DEP “review the performance of a remediation.”220 Some of 
the main factors include: (1) if “the contamination at the site poses a 
significant detrimental impact on the public health, safety, or the envi-
ronment as determined by a[n] . . . evaluation”; (2) if “the contamina-
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tion at the site may affect a licensed child care center, school or other 
sensitive population”; or (3) if “State grants or loans are being used to 
remediate the site.”221 If the submitted documents do not raise one of 
these issues, it is unlikely that the NJ DEP will pursue a remediated site 
any further.222 
 To keep LSRP documentation honest, the NJ DEP has set up an 
auditing process where the board in charge of issuing permits will an-
nually audit at least ten percent of LSRPs.223 Depending on the out-
come of a LSRP’s audit, the NJ DEP may recommend an investigation 
of an LSRP.224 The investigation is a safeguard that allows the board to 
“consider the suspension or revocation” of an LSRP’s license.225 Finally, 
the SRRA lays out protective guidelines for LSRPs who report damag-
ing information about a site.226 Realizing that LSRPs are both employed 
by developers and owe fiduciary duties to properly remediate according 
to state regulations, the SRRA prevents “retaliatory action against li-
censed remediation professional[s].”227 
B. Another Example of Cleanup Privatization: The Massachusetts Model 
 Massachusetts was the first state to create a scheme where the state 
environmental agency essentially privatized cleanup by outsourcing to 
licensed consultants.228 In fact, the Massachusetts model is one of the 
main examples that New Jersey relied upon when designing its own 
program.229 The Massachusetts model shares many similarities with the 
New Jersey LSRP program. At the most basic level, both programs out-
source their brownfield remediation to private parties, with Massachu-
setts law “requir[ing] regulated entities to hire private consultants— 
licensed site professionals (LSPs)—and [to] receive their approval be-
fore mandatory remediation can be considered complete.”230 Like New 
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Jersey, the Massachusetts LSP program oversees the entire hazardous 
waste cleanup with virtually no DEP oversight.231 
 The LSP program also has an auditing feature that is actually 
broader than the New Jersey LSRP.232 As in New Jersey, the Massachu-
setts board has the ability to discipline any LSPs following a negative 
audit.233 However, it is difficult for an LSP to receive a negative audit, 
because the “approval process allows LSPs substantial discretion” as to 
the level at which remediation should occur.234 This is a result of the 
LSP board’s focus on procedure over outcome.235 The Massachusetts 
LSP program lists all of the different services an LSP can potentially 
provide to a client.236 With many ways to participate in the remediation 
process and significant discretion to choose a method, it is not un-
common for a private LSP’s remediation effort to fail to comply with 
existing regulations, let alone meet agency expectations.237 
 Failure to comply with regulations is typically documented by the 
audits conducted by the Massachusetts DEP.238 These audits show that 
“LSPs routinely fail to comply with the regulations governing hazardous 
waste site cleanups, sometimes creating serious risks to human health 
and the environment.”239 In fact, a study of the program from its im-
plementation in 1994 through 2005, shows that every year no more 
than twenty-nine percent of “completed sites” are given passing evalua-
tions.240 A possible reason for the low pass rate is that by privatizing re-
mediation, Massachusetts—and anyone following this model—has cre-
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ated inherent conflicts of interest. This happens in two ways: (1) since 
the LSP responsible for cleanup is often the LSP tasked with approving 
site completion, it behooves the LSP to expend minimal effort before 
approving completion; and (2) the LSP is a private entity hired by a 
developer to remediate a property, yet the LSP simultaneously is 
charged with complying with state regulations.241 The more an LSP 
complies with state regulations, the more costly it is for a developer to 
retain the LSP, thereby diminishing the incentive to hire a good LSP.242 
 In addition to issues involving conflicts of interest, the Massachu-
setts LSP program has also been cited for management and discipline 
problems.243 Some of the management pitfalls are related to its failure 
to provide ongoing monitoring.244 This problem stems from the fact 
that only twenty percent of sites are required to be audited.245 And of 
the twenty percent, most of the audits are only a review of paperwork 
submitted by the LSP.246 In reality, slightly less than two percent of all 
sites actually get a “full fledged ‘comprehensive evaluation’ involving 
actions like sample collection and site visits to ensure compliance.”247 
Because the Massachusetts DEP and the LSP board are separate enti-
ties, each holding limited power, even when failure is detected, “the 
disciplinary architecture fails to deter regulatory [problems].”248 De-
spite its problems, there are many benefits claimed to be associated 
with the Massachusetts LSP program.249 The program is “widely praised 
for enabling the cleanup of thousands more sites per year” than the 
previous government-administered program.250 
VI. Is New Jersey Moving Forward by Moving Backwards? 
 New Jersey is often cited as one of the most progressive states for 
environment and brownfield cleanup policy.251 However, its decision to 
eliminate its VCP and to privatize remediation is a curious change. The 
state’s reversion to the Spill Act necessitates an analysis about what this 
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means for New Jersey’s interaction with the federal government under 
the Brownfields Act, as well as what the LSRP program means for those 
remediating in New Jersey. 
A. Federal-State Interplay 
 Until the passage of the federal Brownfields Act, anyone remediat-
ing a site was potentially liable on both the state and federal levels.252 
With the passage of the Brownfields Act, the federal government de-
clared that it would not interfere with an eligible site if remediated 
through a state plan.253 In virtually all states, remediation is under the 
state VCP.254 However, since the passage of the SRRA, New Jersey no 
longer has a VCP.255 The New Jersey VCP has been replaced by the 
sweeping liability of the Spill Act.256 
 The federal government’s promises not to begin administrative or 
cost recovery actions against sites being remediated under a state plan, 
and New Jersey’s loss of a central plan, is a precarious combination. 
However, New Jersey can still obtain a bar against federal action be-
cause the SRRA makes parties comply with the requirements of the 
Spill Act.257 In reality, the Brownfields Act merely requires that a state 
have a plan, and that the plan is not limited to VCPs: 
Section 128 bars federal enforcement under CERCLA against 
any person who has complied with a VCP that qualifies under 
the 2002 Amendments. The Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has entered into memoranda of agreement (MOA) with 
most states confirming the circumstances under which com-
pliance with the state program constitutes compliance with a 
VCP for purposes of the enforcement bar of section 128. . . . 
However, nothing in CERCLA requires a memorandum of 
agreement in order to invoke the enforcement bar of section 
128.258 
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This is important because the Spill Act is a state program, and the 
Brownfields Act will apply in the same way it would to a VCP.259 As long 
as one of the limited federal reopeners is not triggered, the federal gov-
ernment is unlikely to become involved.260 In fact, the Spill Act has 
stricter liability and standards than the VCP program, making it less like-
ly to produce a reopener and trigger federal action.261 
B. The SRRA’s State Implications 
 As federal liability is even less likely to occur despite the changes 
the SRRA has made, the new Act’s most important impact will be at the 
state level. The effect occurs in two areas: the substance of the Act, and 
its procedure. 
1. Moving Backwards: The Substance of SRRA 
 Under the SRRA, parties have “an affirmative obligation . . . to re-
mediate any discharge for which they would be liable pursuant to the 
Spill Act.”262 This one change annihilated most of the development that 
had occurred over the last thirty years. From 1976, when the Spill Act 
was enacted, until May 2009, when the SRRA repealed the state’s VCP, 
the progression of New Jersey’s remediation programs was linear, pro-
gressive, and logical.263 While no environmental liability plan was per-
fect, each used the lessons learned from previous models to positively 
increase the efficiency, desirability, and end result of brownfield reme-
diation.264 Each generation of programs was able to plug holes left by 
its predecessor.265 The changes made by the New Jersey Legislature 
have effectively reversed those advancements.266 While the Spill Act was 
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an important step when it was enacted,267 future legislation was a re-
sponse to its shortcomings.268 
 The removal of the VCP would not be as harsh if the SRRA en-
acted legislation that prevented the freefall from the VCP all the way 
back to the Spill Act. With no intermediate plan, all the problems asso-
ciated with the Spill Act resurface. Again, individuals will be held re-
sponsible for remediation costs no matter what their actual involve-
ment with the property has been.269 The same fears of liability would 
exist for developers, returning to the concern that they would be 
caught in the wide net of liability, and subject to a high-cost removal.270 
The social and financial costs associated with broad liability schemes 
are documented and well known.271 If financers and developers are de-
terred, brownfields will continue to languish, leaving eyesores that 
place communities of innocent individuals at risk, depress job markets 
and tax bases, and cause the acceleration of urban sprawl.272 
 Developers were known to let contaminated sites languish, rather 
than put them into use because they were afraid to be held jointly and 
severally liable for site remediation—joint and several liability being the 
main feature of the Spill Act.273 A reversion to this method is of ques-
tionable value, considering the changes made to move away from it. It 
may not matter if the new program is capable of enabling the cleanup 
of many more sites, if developers are too afraid to actually come for-
ward about owning contaminated sites.274 The New Jersey VCP may 
have been slower and more cumbersome, but this is a natural byprod-
uct for a program that nurtured the flexibility needed to attract con-
taminated site owners to remediate sites.275 
 The broad liability of the Spill Act will continue to exist under the 
SRRA, yet the LSRP program has the potential to control how sites are 
remediated once a site comes forward.276 With this power, the LSRP 
can mitigate many of the distressing factors outlined in this Note by 
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having the licensed professionals administer remediation with flexibil-
ity akin to the New Jersey VCP.277 The problems with broad liability can 
be offset if LSRPs take steps to retain the flexibility of the old VCP.278 
2. Implementation: Structuring the LSRP Program to Maximize 
Cleanup Potential 
 The changes enacted by the SRRA were designed to be perma-
nent. New Jersey is in severe financial trouble, and by outsourcing site 
remediation to private companies, the state is saving a tremendous 
amount of money.279 The fact that New Jersey lacks the resources to 
administer a full-time VCP does not mean that it cannot remain in-
volved in the remediation of its own brownfields. Remediation does not 
need to be an all or nothing, public versus private affair; if the state in-
tends on keeping the privatized structure of LSRP, then it should struc-
ture the program to meet as many of the fundamental goals of brown-
field remediation as it can. 
 As it is currently situated, the New Jersey LSRP program is destined 
to encounter many of the same pitfalls as the Massachusetts model on 
which it is based.280 Because the programs are structured almost identi-
cally, it is a logical conclusion that New Jersey will suffer from many of 
the same problems that the Massachusetts program has.281 Observers 
have already identified problems with conflicts of interest for the li-
censed professionals, as well as issues dealing with the state DEP control 
over management and discipline.282 By correcting these problems, New 
Jersey could turn the SRRA, an Act that initially appeared to be a step 
backwards, into a program that provides standards as high as any past 
program, while doing so more efficiently.283 The positive aspects of out-
sourced remediation, “namely volume and speed of cleanups com-
pleted,” will be better utilized in a system where the remediation taking 
place is actually meeting its stated goals.284 
 The major problems with an outsourced remediation program can 
be broken down into two areas: conflicts of interest and manage-
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ment.285 Conflicts of interest can occur internally and externally for 
LSRPs.286 Internal conflicts of interest occur when an LSRP is both re-
sponsible for remediating the site in question and for approving the 
site.287 Academics have already identified this problem in Massachusetts 
and have come up with easily implemented, cost- effective solutions to 
deal with this problem.288 Simply put, New Jersey should promulgate a 
regulation saying “that an LS[R]P cannot render a professional opinion 
on a site for which she herself drafted the plans.”289 This way, LSRPs are 
double-checking the work of their peers; no one would be able to cut 
corners and get away with it simply by approving his or her own mis-
deed.290 As to external conflicts of interest, the state could act as a mid-
dle man between the LSRP and the site owners.291 This would remove 
the double-edged sword of both being employed by a site owner and 
needing to report on infractions which could be quite costly to the 
same owner.292 Having the state hire the LSRP, then charging site cli-
ents itself would create a needed buffer.293 New Jersey’s anti-retaliation 
regulation partially addresses this issue, but not to the extent needed to 
ensure proper reporting.294 
 The management problems will require more substantive changes 
to correct. A more extensive audit process would disabuse LSRPs of the 
notion that shoddy remediation will go overlooked; it will show them 
that such work will be identified and punished.295 Massachusetts has 
problems with the breadth of its audit process despite having a system 
with twice as many mandatory audits.296 Obviously this suggestion 
would require the NJ DEP to reinvest some of the money it saved by 
outsourcing remediation in the first place, but it would go a long way 
towards providing better results.297 To buttress their audits, it would also 
behoove the NJ DEP to unify the disciplinary scheme.298 Splitting the 
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power between the board and the NJ DEP limits its effectiveness.299 Im-
plementing these changes is the most effective route towards providing 
quality remediation under the SRRA. Although the New Jersey VCP was 
effective in its time, and the logical progression for site remediation 
would appear to be BDA initiatives, the reality is that in difficult eco-
nomic times, there is little chance of their broad implementation.300 
Conclusion 
 The New Jersey BDA initiative is the ideal remediation program 
for every state. Since the implementation of broad liability legislation, 
site remediation programs have been on a slow track towards the BDA 
and its complete vision of site remediation.301 The problems associated 
with broad liability were identified and many of those problems were 
addressed with the NJ VCP.302 That program was refined even more 
thoroughly with the creation of the BDA, which finally achieve total 
community remediation.303 In the linear progression of environmental 
regulations, the BDA is the farthest that New Jersey has come. There-
fore, it makes little sense that New Jersey has moved backwards toward 
the Spill Act, the BDA’s archaic counterpart. However, environmental 
cleanup does not take place in a vacuum. State budgets are limited, and 
not every brownfield remediation can be performed with the level of 
care exemplified by the BDA.304 New Jersey in particular has seen mas-
sive budget cuts and faced the difficult decision to abandon most of its 
control over the remediation process by privatizing it.305 
 These changes have not been ideal. The sweeping liability reen-
acted by SRRA is cause for some unease.306 However, the LSRP program 
implemented by SRRA has the potential to make several changes that 
will maximize its effectiveness as a remediation program.307 Ultimately, 
environmental cleanup is not about public versus private remediation. 
It is concerned with addressing the host of problems outlined in Part 
III, and encouraging developers to remediate their brownfield sites.308 
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As a fiscally constrained state, New Jersey is unlikely to move away from 
the privatized scheme of SRRA,309 but by implementing regulations that 
limit conflicts of interests, for virtually no cost, the program can be-
come more effective.310 With an understanding of the brownfield prob-
lem, and a similar understanding of the effectiveness of programs used 
to remediate them, the NJ DEP can implement regulations to maximize 
review and avoid conflicts of interest.311 Privatized cleanups have al-
ready been touted as being able to remediate a large number of sites in 
a more rapid manner than traditional state programs.312 By coupling 
these benefits with greater LSRP accountability, New Jersey will have 
effectively taken its lessons learned and made the SRRA the best it can 
possibly be.313 
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